ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
Many misunderstandings about fuzzy logic (in a narrow sense, i.e. fuzzy logic as a symbolic logical calculus) stem from the confusion between fuzziness as vagueness (impreciseness) on the one hand and uncertainty as partial belief (probabilistic or other) on the other hand, in spite of the fact that this difference has been stressed by several authors. Vagueness concerns degrees of truth and leads to many-valued logics, whereas uncertainty concerns degrees of belief and is best formalized as a sort of modal logic. See e.g. [9, 5, 11] . The main difference concerns the presence or absence of truth-functionality. Fuzzy logic deals with fuzzy propositions that may have intermediate degrees of truth (related often to values of some quantity such as height) and is usually understood as truth-functional, i.e., the truth degree of a compound formula (conjunction, disjunction, negation, etc.) is a function of the truth degrees of its components (computed using generalized truth tables). On the other hand, uncertainty as degree of belief about the truth of a crisp proposition is best understood as some measure (not necessarily probabilistic measure) on the set of all possible worlds (possible states, elementary events) assigning to a proposition p the measure of the set of all worlds in which p is true--and as such it is not truth-functional. We shall prefer possibility measures; and a possibility measure II satisfies H(A v B) = max(II(A), II(B)), but the possibility of A A B is not a function of H(A), II(B). This is reminiscent of modal logic with modalities ~ (possibly) and [] (necessarily). For most modal systems, O(A v B) is equivalent to ~A v ©B, but ~(A A B) is not equivalent to ~A A OB. The mathematical framework to define semantics of modal logic--Kripke models--generalizes often to systems with other modalities.
Even if formulas bear possibilities, which are numerical values, we may be interested not in the values themselves but in their comparison, i.e. investigate formulas A ~ B saying that B is at least as possible as A. Here <1 behaves as a modality generalizing in some sense the modality (possibly). The logical language using <1 is qualitative (or, we can say, comparative), i.e., it does not have means to express possibilities as numbers, but only their comparisons. This leads to interesting, welldefined, and natural logical systems, and the question naturally emerges if they are related to some classical systems of modal logic. Developing formal logics like ours, we show what certain and crisp statements can be made about uncertainty and fuzziness. A completeness result shows that our axiomatization completely grasps truth (1-tautologicity). And a natural embedding of a system of a logic of uncertainty into a more "classical" modal logic (both fuzzy) shows that our system fits well into the population of established modal logic systems, which supports our belief that the system is sound (well defined, adequately formalizing some aspects of uncertainty and vagueness).
In [1] a qualitative possibilistic modal logic is studied and related to a tense (temporal) logic with finite linearly preordered time. [1] is related to [6] ; among other things, the system QPL of [6] is shown to be incomplete (but complete for formulas without nested modalities), and a complete system is presented. A complementary paper is [3] ; this paper also relates modal possibilistic logic to a (different) tense logic and discusses [6] , but e.g. the above-mentioned results of [1] on incompleteness and completion of QPL do not occur in [3] (and various results of [3] do not occur in [1] ). Here we analyze a logical system dealing with both fuzziness and uncertainty, which means, formally, that it is both many-valued and modal. Many-valued modal logics have been investigated by some authors (see [16, 7, 8] ); this makes our investigation easier. Trying to build a system of qualitative fuzzy possibilistic logic, we immediately meet the problem how to compare formulas of fuzzy logic with respect to their possibility or, more generally, with respect to possibilities of worlds on which they have a given truth value. This can be done in various ways; we develop two of them and show that they are closely related to each other and also to a system of many-valued tense logic (with reflexive linearly preordered time).
The reader may wonder why we speak of tense logics in relation to possibilistic logic. The primary reasons is, admittedly, formal: structures defining the semantics of possibilistic logics lead naturally to structures defining the semantics of various tense (temporal) logics, i.e. to structures where the set of possible worlds bears a (pre)order. Relating our logical systems formally to some well-established systems is a desirable thing, witnessing mathematical soundness of our systems. But in our opinion one may learn even more: relating possibilistic logic to tense logic may improve our intuitive understanding of what possibilities (of the possibility theory) are: one interpretation of I'I(A) is the last time moment at which A is true (in the infinite case, the supremum of these moments).
We mention the paper [13] , where a definition of the possibility of a fuzzy formula is given that is drastically different from that used in the present paper; this leads to a fuzzy modal logic unrelated (apparently) to any tense logic, but related to fuzzy variants of $5 (logic of knowledge) and KD45 (logic of belief). The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we elaborate the definition of our two calculi of qualitative fuzzy logic and prove some theorems about them; in Section 3 we introduce our many-valued tense logic, state a completeness theorem, and show a relation to our fuzzy logic. Section 4 contains the main theorem, showing that our two systems, in spite of different semantics, have the same tautologies and extend conservatively to our tense logic. Section 5 summarizes our conclusions and presents some additional information (including a proof of the completeness theorem).
A preliminary short version of this paper appeared as [12] . Note that the tense logic in the present paper differs from that of [12] ; see Remark 4.2 for a comparison.
TWO QUALITATIVE FUZZY LOGICS

Values, Symbols, Formulas
We fix n + 1 > 2--the number of truth values. Values --{0, 1/n, 2/n,..., 1} is the set of values. Our symbols are propositional variables, connectives A, V, ~, --1 (conjunction, disjunction, implication, negation), and a unary connective (i) for each i • Values; modalities will be introduced later. Modality-free formulas are built from propositional variables using connectives. For example, A -~ (1)A is a formula.
Truth Tables
We shall use Lukasiewicz's truth tables for connectives: minimum and maximum for conjunction and disjunction respectively, implication I(i, j) = rain(l, 1 -i + j), negation N(i) = 1 -i; for each i, the truth table 6 i of the connective (i) assigns 1 to i and 0 to each j =~ i. (Note that these connectives are in fact definable in Lukasiewicz's logic; cf. [10, 16] . However, for technical reasons we taken them as primitive.) Most of our investigations are valid also for other choices of semantics of connectives, e.g. G6del's logics [10] ; but we shall not rely on this. Besides fuzzy possibilistic Kripke structures we shall investigate also fuzzy tense Kripke structures (IV, I~-, < ) where W and I~-are as above and < is a reflexive linear preorder of IV, i.e., < is reflexive, transitive, and connected: (Vw, v E WXw < v or v < w). Clearly, each fuzzy possibilistic structure (W, I~-, 7r) determines a tense structure (W, I~-, <~) where w <~ v iff 7r(w) < 7r(v) (as reals). • But for some infinite (W, 7r) the two preorders do coincide; here is an example. 
Kripke Structures
., the only t ~ Z such that z -e < t < z is z itself. If (W, r; ) is such that ~r[W] = {Tr(w) [ w ~ W} is isolated from below, then the correspondingpreorders ~ and ~' coincide.
(This is because for Z isolated from below, if y ~ Z, X _c Z, and all elements of X are less than y, then sup X < y.)
LEMMA 2.3 There is a countable set Z c [0, 1] which is isolated from below and is densely ordered by the usual ordering of reals, i.e., (Vzl,
Z 2 E Z) (z 1 < z z ~ (Tqz0) (z l < z 0 <~ z2) ).
Proof Hint: Take all positive rational numbers in the unit interval whose decimal expansion is finite and contains only digits 0 and 7.
• 
Comparing Formulas
Recall the sets worlds(A, i) and worlds(A, > i) given by a formula A and a truth value i. We shall introduce two binary modalities < and <~' such that, for each K = (W, I~-, ~-)
IIA <' Bllw = 1 iff the same, with -<' instead of ~ .
It is clear that IIA < BIIw and IIA <' BIIw are independent of w. In the rest of the paper, when IIAIIw does not depend on w, we will often simply write IlZll.
If IIh < BII = 1, we say that A is at most aspossible as B; if I[h <' BII = 1, we say that A is dominated by B. 
i)).
Note that there is always at least one j such that II(worlds(B,j))> II(worlds(A, i)), since for some j we have II(worlds(B, j)) = 1. The bigger is the maximal j satisfying the above, the bigger is the value of the implication I(i, j); this value is 1 iff i < j. Thus maxj{I(i, j) I worlds(A, i) worlds(B, j)} may be understood as the truth value of the fuzzy statement "for some truth degree j not much less than i, II(B, j) > H(A, j)." The quantity min i maxi{I(i,j) lworlds(A , i)~ worlds(B, j)} then can be understood as the truth value of the statement "for each truth value i, there is a j not much less then i such that II(B,j)> II(A,j). We can read A <~ B as "B is almost at least as possible as A," and A <' B as "B almost dominates A." If the value is 1, the word "almost" becomes superfluous. 1 EXAMPLE 2.2 In Example 2.1 verify that liP < qll = ~.
The Calculi Defined
Now we are finally ready to complete our definition of two qualitative fuzzy logics: 
IlK(WOrlds(B, i)) = IIK,(Worlds(B, i)).
In particular, if (1), (2) hold for B and C (and all i), then clearly liB < CIIg = liB < CIIg' (independently of w); this is the induction step for <.
• Remark 2.3 The analogous lemma holds for countable tense models and QFL' formulas thanks to Corollary 2.1 (and the fact that each countable linear order is isomorphically embeddable into the countable dense order without endpoints). We shall prove a weaker finiteness theorem for QFL' later (see Theorem 4.1).
A MANY-VALUED TENSE LOGIC
We are going to relate our qualitative fuzzy logics to a many-valued tense logic with reflexive linearly preordered time. The logic in question, denoted by MTL, will have the same modality-free formulas, truth values, and truth tables as the logic QFL described in the previous section; but it will have two unary modalities G, H (read "in all future and present worlds," "in all past and present worlds" respectively).
Kripke models have the form (W, I~-, < ), where < is a reflexive linear preorder on W.
The semantics of the modality G is as follows:
and analogously for H (infw,_<w). We further define FA--~G(~A),
PA --7 H(-~ A), [] A -GA A HA, ~A ---i D(-~ A). The formulas FA, PA, [] A, ~A are read:
A holds in some future or present world, some past or present world, in all worlds, in some worlds.
Caution Observe that the semantics of the modalities is defined differently from [12] , where we worked with strict linear preorder < . Thus, again, our modalities are "always from now on" and "always until now," and hence are hidden universal quantifications over possible worlds > w or < w. Hence the interpretation by infimum is very standard, and we just generalize usual two-valued tense logics with linearly ordered time (working with finitely many truth values and with linear preorders instead linear orders; thus in one time moment there may be several alternative possible worlds). DEFINITION 
A formula is called Boolean if it results from formulas of the form (i)A using connectives and modalities. Clearly, if B is Boolean then IIBIIw is 0 or 1.
AXIOMS (a)
Propositional axioms. Some choice of axioms complete for the given propositional calculus (cf. [10] ): some few axioms for implication and other connectives; furthermore,
(
1) V i (i)A, (2) A i~j ~((i)A A (j)A) (saying that each formula has exactly one truth value), (3) (i)A A (j)B ~ (rain(i, j))(A A B)
, and similarly for other connectives V, ~, -1, e.g. 
) G(> i)A -(> i)GA, G(<i)A -(<i)FA, H(> i)A-(>_i)HA, H( < i)A -( < i)PA (an analog of Fitting's axioms [7, 8]). [Note that (> i)A is V j> g(j)A etc.] DEDUCTION RULES of this modal logic Modus ponens, necessitation for G, H (e.g., "from A infer GA"), and also "from A infer (1)A."
Caution To avoid misunderstanding, let us stress again that some axioms are assumed only for Boolean formulas, i.e. formulas whose syntactic form guarantees that they take only values 0, 1 in all evaluations. Only for such formulas do we have full propositional calculus. But all axioms and deduction rules are 1-sound, i.e., axioms are 1-tautologies (true in all worlds of all Kripke models with reflexive linear ordering), and all deduction rules convert 1-tautologies to 1-tautologies. This is the content of the following lemma. Finally we prove 1-soundness of necessitation by G: if A is a 1-tautology, then A has value 1 in each world w of each Kripke model K; then also GA has value 1 in w (since it has value 1 in all w' > w from K).
The rest is similar.
• Remark 3.1 Axioms (4)- (6) are very similar to the tense logic Lin defined in [14] . Because we added the reflexivity axiom, the axioms (6) [2] ). The axioms (7) are inspired by Fitting [7] , even if not identical with his axioms.
THEOREM 3.1 (Completeness theorem) MTL F-A (A is provable in our tense logic) iff A is a 1-tautology of MTL, i.e., A has the value 1 in all worlds of all Kripke models with reflexive linearly preordered time.
The proof is a variant of the standard method of canonical models for two-valued tense logic (cf. [14] ), and is presented in Section 5. For general information on tense logics and corresponding proof techniques see [2, 4] .
Our proof, combined with the fact that MTL satisfies the finite-model property (see Lemma 5.9 below), in fact gives the following
LEMMA 3.2 A formula A is not provable in MTL if and only if there is a Kripke structure ( W, I~-, < ) with W finite and such that for some w ~ W, (< 1)A is true in w.
The following lemma relates QFL' to MTL. •
MAIN THEOREM
In this section we show how closely related are our two fuzzy logics QFL and QFL' to each other and to the tense logic MTL. For each QFL formula do we define its QFL' variant do' and the translation do* of do into the language of MTL. Then we show that qb has a model iff do' has iff do* has. Let us make the necessary definitions. We see that the mapping * makes MTL a conservative extension of QFL (and similarly for QFL'); do is a 1-tautology of QFL iff dO* is a 1-tautology of MTL.
Let us note at this point that in [12] a different tense logic MTL* is used, with three basic modalities "in all future worlds," "in all present worlds," "in all past worlds." A similar (two-valued) logic was used in [1] ; [3] has a two-valued logic with two modalities, one nonstrict (we would say "in all present or future worlds") and one strict ("in all past worlds"; but Boutilier does not speak of tense logics). Clearly, MTL* is stronger (more expressive) than MTL; in particular, MTL* does not have the finite-model property. (Neither the logic of Bendovfi and Hfijek nor that of Boutilier has the finite-model property.) Nevertheless, for (interpretations of) QFL formulas, both MTL and MTL* have the same strength: both extend QFL (as well as QFL') conservatively.
APPENDIX
We prove the completeness theorem for MTL and close with some remarks. Similarly for the other modalities.
Proof Hints: (13) and (14) follow from (7); (15) follows also from (7) using w (
i)GA =-(> i)GA A (< i)GA and ~-G( > i)A ---, (F( < i)A F(i)A)
[by (12) ]. The proof of (16) 
formula A). A Boolean formula A is provable in T (notation T ~-A) if it has a propositionalprooffrom members of T using only modus ponens (i.e., necessitation is not allowed). T is inconsistent if T ~-A and T ~ -7 A for Boolean A. We remind the reader that for i ~ j the formulas ( i)A, ( j)A are incompatible; thus for given A, a consistent theory T may contain at most one formula of the form (i)A. If T is consistent and complete, then for each A, there is exactly one i such that (i)A ~ T. A theory T is maximal consistent if T is consistent and all theories T' D T are inconsistent. T is complete if for each Boolean A, T F-A or T ~-~ A. T is closed under provability if for each Boolean A we have that T F-A implies that A ~ T.
LEMMA 5.2 Each consistent theory T has a maximal consistent extension T'.
Proof By the usual Lindenbaum construction. The novice may consult any standard textbook of logic, e.g. [15] .
• LEMMA 5.3 Maximal consistent theories are complete and closed under provability.
Proof As usual, remembering that for Boolean theories we have full propositional logic, including the deduction theorem; thus if T ~ A, then (T ~-~ A) is consistent.
•
DEFINITION 5.2 Let T be a maximal consistent theory; for each formula A, put e(A) = i iff T contains the formula (i)A. An evaluation is an e
given by a maximal consistent theory T.
LEMMA 5.4 If e is as above, then e commutes with connectives, i.e., e(A A B)= min(e(A), e(B)), etc.; furthermore, e(A)= 1 for each MTL-provable A.
Proof We have e(A A B) = i iff (i)(A /~ B) ~ T; also the following formula is in T: (j)A A (k)B ~ (min(j, k))(A A B). Take j, k such that j = e(A), k = e(B); then (j)A m (k)B ~ T, hence (min(j, k))(A /~ B)
T, thus i = min(j, k).
• LEMMA 5. Proof Reflexivity: We have to show that for all formulas A and for all evaluations e, e(GA) < e(A). Suppose that e is given by the theory T, and suppose that e(GA) = i, i.e. Not branching towards the future: Suppose e 0 R el and e0 R e 2, where e 0, el, e 2 are given by T 0, T 1, T 2 respectively. We have to prove that el R e 2 or e 2 R e~. In order to derive a contradiction, suppose that neither disjunct holds. 
T O F-G(P((> a)A A (> b)B) v F((> a)A A (> b)B)).
Because e 0 R e2, this implies Proof =~ : By Lemma 3.4. : If A is not provable, then (1)A is not provable; thus (< 1)A is a consistent Boolean formula, so there is an evaluation e 0 with e0(A) < 1.
T 2 ~-P((> a)A A (> b)B) V F((> a)
Define the model K = (W, I~-, _< ), where W is the set of all evaluations e such that e 0 R e or e R e 0, where R is as in Definition 5.8, < is R restricted to W, and It-is defined by Ilplle = e(p) for propositional variables p. Now it is easy to check by induction on the complexity of the formula, using Lemma 5.4 and the valuation I~mma 5.8, that for all e, B one has IIBIle = e(B) [ we leave the (i) step to the reader]. In particular, IlAlle0 < 1.
Moreover, by Lemma 5.6 we conclude that < is a reflexive linear preorder on W. This finishes the proof.
In order to prove Lemma 3.2, the following lemma suffices: • Remark 5.1 (1) We have shown in the main theorem that both QFL and QFL' embed faithfully to MTL and presented a complete axiom system for MTL. Thus a formula ~ of QFL is a 1-tautology with respect to the semantics of QFL iff its translation ~* is provable in MTL.
Recall that the only modality of QFL is < (binary), whereas the modalities of MTL are G, H (unary). The problem remains to find an elegant axiomatization of 1-tautologies of QFL in the language of QFL. (A pedestrian axiomatization is easy to obtain by reducing everything to Boolean formulas [in particular reducing A < B to a formula involving only (i)A < (j)B] and applying the axiom system of [1] .) In attacking this problem one may start by testing axioms of QPL: some of them are 1-tautologies of our logic (e.g. transitivity), but some are not [e.g. dichotomy (A < B) V (B < A)]. For example, is there a complete axiom system for QFL (and hence for QFL') whose axioms concerning modalities do not contain coefficients? (2) Moreover, one can investigate logics based on comparison of other fuzzy truth values, infinitely valued systems, and many other variations. The purpose of the present paper is mainly to show the direction for future research.
